Location

Berlin, Germany

About me

Main informations about me and what I love to do.

Hey, I'm a Daniel Parra
Hello, I'm a Daniel Parra

I am interested in Behavioral and Experimental Economics. I am especially focused on the study of unethical behaviors such as lying and corruption.

129 Projects Complate

400 Satisfied Clients

8 Years job experience

+15 awards won

Education
Berlin School of Economics - Germany
2017-Current

Humboldt-University, the Free University, the Technical University, WZB, and ESMT., Berlin, Germany.

M.A. game theory, experimental economics and applied econo- metrics, - France
2013 – 2014

GATE-LSE - Université Lumière Lyon 2, Lyon, France.

B.A. Economics - Colombia
2007 – 2011

Industrial University of Santander, Bucaramanga, Colombia

Experience
Research Fellow - Berlin
2017 - Current

Berlin Social Science Center (WZB).

Researcher and Lecturer - Colombia
2015 – 2017

Catholic University of Colombia.

Adjunct lecturer - Lozano
2015 – 2016

University of Bogota Jorge Tadeo Lozano.

Researcher - Lozano
2011 – 2014

Investigation group EMAR. Z-tree programming and Experiments Design

Research assistant - Colombia
2010 – 2011

Economics and Management Department. Indus-trial University of Santander (Colombia)

Research

I Have Worked With A Number Of Clients.

  • Publications
    The role of suggestions and tips in distorting a third party's decision. Games (Paper link).

    I analyze the impact of suggestive advice messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design is based on a model with three players, wherein two players create, by an investment of resources and effort, a joint pie, and the third player must decide how much of the pie to allocate to each of the first two players. To assess the impact of suggestive messages and tips, I use a baseline treatment in which there is no way of influencing the decision-maker. Thus, if the treatments’ manipulations are unable to bias decision-makers, their decisions should be the same as those made under the baseline conditions. The main finding is that the possibility of an ex-post monetary gift (tip) increases the value allocated to a player who may tip the decision-maker in comparison with a context-free of influence. Conversely, suggestive messages do not have this effect, and can even reduce the value allocated to the sender.

    Because I (don't) deserve it: Entitlement and lying behavior. With Tilman Fries. Accepted at Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. (Working Paper link)

    I analyze the impact of suggestive advice messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design is based on a model with three players, wherein two players create, by an investment of resources and effort, a joint pie, and the third player must decide how much of the pie to allocate to each of the first two players. To assess the impact of suggestive messages and tips, I use a baseline treatment in which there is no way of influencing the decision-maker. Thus, if the treatments’ manipulations are unable to bias decision-makers, their decisions should be the same as those made under the baseline conditions. The main finding is that the possibility of an ex-post monetary gift (tip) increases the value allocated to a player who may tip the decision-maker in comparison with a context-free of influence. Conversely, suggestive messages do not have this effect, and can even reduce the value allocated to the sender.

  • Work in progress
  • Photography

Languages

I Have done With A Number Of Languages.

colombia

Colombia

English

English, Fluent

French

French, Advanced (B2)

German

German, Beginner (A2)

Computer skills

A Number Of Computer skills.

Pyhton

Pyhton

Z-tree

Z-tree

Otree

Otree

R

R

LATEX

LATEX

Stata

Stata.

html5

html5

css

css

bootstrap

Bootstrap